

Appendix One: Source 1B: Traditional Chinese view of nationalism

Summary written by A. Lawrence, based on his reading of Smith, W.W.(1996) *Tibetan Nation*, Westview Press, Boulder

See also, the diagram on page 28 of *Tibetan Nation*

The Middle Kingdom: Was the name given to the land controlled by the Han. This was the basis of Imperial China.

Royal Domains: This was territory that was considered to be ethnically Han (the dominant ethnic group in China). This was the land that was administered directly from the capital. The succeeding Dynasties of China ruled this area regardless of ethnic background (i.e. Yuan and Qing Dynasties).

Princes Domains: This was the area that was directly under Han control, but administered by local chieftains. Han culture, religion and rule were imposed. Different ethnic groups made up this domain and land was awarded for loyalty and service to the Imperial Throne. Tribute was given to the Imperial Throne.

Pacification Zones: This was land that was in dispute or undergoing assimilation into Han society. This land was often in the border regions of Imperial China and as a result was used as a protective barrier against marauding tribes. These Zones (once pacified) would demonstrate loyalty through offering tribute.

Zone of Allied Barbarians: This was land outside Han control, but had adopted culture, administration and rule. These groups paid tribute to China and recognised its supremacy. This land would later be incorporated into Imperial China.

Zone of Cultureless Barbarians: This was land that the Chinese had no control over.

The Chinese believed that China was the centre of the world. Hence they referred to themselves as the Middle Kingdom. There was the belief that the Emperor was the universal ruler and was destined to control the known world. These ideals were based on the Confucian ideas relating to Tao and the five relationships. As a result Han China took on a paternal role in relations with differing ethnic groups. The Chinese expected the lesser nations to pay tribute to them in forms of goods and to follow protocol when conducting relations with China. In return the Chinese would protect the vassal groups and incorporate them into the Chinese Empire. In addition the Chinese believed that all ethnic minorities were part of the Empire (even the Cultureless Barbarians), and wanted to be assimilated into Han.

Appendix 2: Source 2A: Chinese Claims to Tibet

Summary written by A. Lawrence, based on his reading of Smith, W.W. (1996) *Tibetan Nation*, Westview Press, Boulder

The Chinese justification for the events of 1950, is based on the traditional Chinese viewpoint that Tibet has always been an integral part of its territory. This belief extends back to around 1254 in which Tibet and the Mongols concluded a pact that allowed for the Mongol protection of Tibet in return for spiritual leadership. Prior to this pact, Tibet had been a powerful central Asian power, which had fought against Turks, Kazaks, Mongols and the Chinese. Numerous battles took place, as did peace agreements. One such agreement allowed for the Tibetan ruler, Srongstan Gampo to marry a Chinese Princess, Wencheng. Upon her arrival in Lhasa, Wencheng established the Jokhang Temple, and the Tibetan conversion to Buddhism had begun. In 792 the Tibetans and T'ang China signed a treaty that brought peace and established the borders between China and Tibet. However, the Tibetans broke the terms of the treaty and the conflict resumed. In 822 the Chinese and Tibetans signed another peace treaty which guaranteed the border between the nations.

The Chinese claim to Tibet dates to the relationship established by one sect of Buddhists. A lama of Sakya sect, Sakya Pandita and Khublai Khan's administrator, Phagspa formed a close link that altered the nature of the relationship. This link, *Cho-Yon* made the Tibetan form of Buddhism an integral part of Mongol society. The teaching of the lama was accepted in return for the vassalage of Tibet. The victory over the Han and the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty incorporated Tibet into the Chinese Empire as a state of the Mongol Empire. Due to its personal nature this relationship ended with the deaths of Sakya and Phagspa, but had a long lasting impact. Mongol patronage of the differing Buddhist sects allowed for the accumulation of power under the Theocracy, which dominated Tibetan Society until the Communist Invasion/Liberation. As the Yuan Dynasty lost power, the nature of Tibet's link to the Mongol patrons changed, greater autonomy was given, laws abolished, the monarchy re-established and the growth of new Buddhist sects occurred

In 1368, the Yuan Dynasty (Mongol) was deposed and was succeeded by the Ming (Han). The new rulers realised that the best way to deal with the Tibetans was through the *Cho-Yon* relationship. However their motivation was a little different from the Yuan. Although the Mongols had lost the Imperial Throne, they still remained a powerful force. Concerned with this threat, the Ming used Tibet as a controlling influence over the Mongols. Whilst content to use Tibet as an intermediary between themselves as the Mongols, the Ming altered little from the later years of the Yuan Dynasty. Essentially this allowed for the establishment of a Tibetan Nation, administered from Lhasa. The Ming continued the practice of patronising the different sects, but many Tibetan lamas refused to accept the offices given to them. The changing nature of the Ming-Mongol relation impacted on Tibet. No longer needed as a conduit, Ming interest declined, they concentrated mainly on establishing their own

dominance amongst the ethnic Han of the Empire. The Tibetans still retained strong links with the Mongols, who had started to move into Tibetan lands after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty. These migrating Mongols gave the Tibetans a simple choice, accept the relocation and Buddhism would be accepted, refuse the move and be conquered. Understandably, the Tibetans accepted the demand and the *Cho-Yon* relationship was re-established with the Mongols. In 1578, Sonam Gyatso, an abbot of the Gelugpa monastery at Drepung was invited to attend the Mongol capital and to meet one of the Mongol rulers, Altan Khan. During this meeting Sonam Gyatso revealed to Altan Khan that he was the reincarnation of Phagspa and that Altan was the reincarnation of Kubilai Khan. This allowed Altan Khan to claim for himself the undisputed leadership of the Mongols and for Sonam Gyatso to elevate the Gelugpa sect to supremacy. The Khan named Sonam Gyatso as *Dalai Lama (the Ocean of Wisdom)* and allowed him to assume all spiritual and temporal power in Tibet. This elevation of the Gelugpa sect created tension amongst many of the other Buddhist sects and resulted in civil unrest. Many of the eastern Tibetans appealed for Ming patronage to combat the Mongol supported Gelugpa. The unrest continued until the Mongol leader suppressed the revolt and revived the power of the Gelugpa. Under the Gelugpa sect, Tibet was unified and the sectarian schisms removed albeit under the influence of the Mongols.

When the Ming Dynasty fell, the Manchu Qing again tried to utilise the Tibetans as link to the Mongols, the Fifth Dalai Lama was invited to Peking and treated with reverence. The protocols of the Imperial Chinese court required all envoys to Kow-tow before the Emperor to show their submission, however upon meeting the Dalai Lama this etiquette was forgone. The Qing relation with Tibet remained the same as with the Ming up until a revolt in 1720, when after the Dalai Lama's death the leadership was usurped. The country dissolved again into civil unrest, which was only restored under the Qing. As a result the Qing set up a provisional government comprised of six Tibetans under the leadership of the Qing commander. This was replaced in 1721 with a council (*Kashag*), which was comprised of three Tibetan ministers (*Kalon*) and headed by a Qing *Amban*. The role of the Dalai Lama was symbolic but he still retained a lot of power owing to his position with the Mongols. From 1720, Tibet became a protectorate of China and whilst guided by Peking retained its own political leadership. This was due to the declining threat of the Mongols and consolidation of Qing rule in China. Throughout the 1700s Tibetan autonomy was gradually eroded and the Qing increased their administrative influence in Tibet.

This growth in influence was short lived. Under great pressure internally and externally, the Qing had started to lose influence. In 1847 the *Amban* abandoned financial and military powers to the Tibetans and by the end of the 19th century the Tibetans had created government organisations that looked after religious and secular interests. Whilst guided by Peking, Tibet was not incorporated into the Empire. The Han did not control China but were the subjects of foreign powers. Tibet's relationships were with the Mongols and the Manchus rather than the Han and as a result Tibet never came under

Chinese (Han) administration. The same undercurrent of European imperialism that was plaguing China also affected Tibet.

Appendix Three: Source 6A: Anti Rebellion Campaign

Summary written by A. Lawrence based on his reading of Tsering Shakya (1999) *The dragon in the land of snows: a history of modern Tibet since 1947*, Pimlico, London.

At first the main effect of the reforms was not economic but social: a new style of politics, mass meetings, public struggle sessions and a new message. This new style of political participation made a great impact on the Tibetans. New ideas meant new relationships, between the ruler and the governed, between monks and laity, man and woman, between classes—all of which were experiencing profound transformation. There were some major structural alterations in traditional relations, but they were confined mainly to settled agricultural communities—the nomadic groups were exempted from the original reforms. Ngabo announced at the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART) meeting that in the nomad areas policy would concentrate on implementing the Anti-Rebellion campaign. Reforms would be restricted to abolishing grazing rights granted to manorial lords and redistributing the rights and livestock belonging to those who took part in the revolt. If the explicit aim of the reforms was to solicit support from the Tibetan masses, the implicit objective was to punish those who had taken part in the revolt. The message was clear; as long as the ruling class continued to cooperate with the Communists, they could still enjoy their positions. The Panchen Rinpoche announced that “all members of the upper strata who support and agree to actively take part in the reform will have their livelihood secured and their political status guaranteed.” The abolition of feudal labour and the reduction of rent did not cripple the economic status of the lay ruling classes. In fact, leading aristocratic families had recognised the inevitability of reforms and had already begun to redistribute and disband their manorial estates; the Dalai Lama's own family had begun to disband their estates and distribute their lands to the peasants in the early 1950s. Since the 1950s many of the aristocrats had been appointed to various posts in the government and were receiving wages so they no longer depended on revenue from their subjects.

The reforms were to have a very dramatic effect on the religious institutions. What the Tibetans called *chad zhi* (religious estates), provided the income for the monasteries and for the lamas. While the lay manorial estates were concerned with individual families, who could easily look for other economic means, thousands of monks depended on the monastery and on contributions from lay followers. Any reduction in monastic income would undoubtedly have major repercussions on the ability of these monastic establishments to support large numbers of monks. The monasteries would not voluntarily accept any changes in their economic basis, nor would the Tibetans challenge their status and privileges. Without these the monasteries and other religious institutions could not function. In Tibet, land was divided between three groups: aristocrats, government and the religious estates. In Lhokha in southern Tibet, for example, 29.6% of the land was owned by the lay aristocracy, 30.9% by the government, while the largest owners were the monasteries with 39.5%. Apart from land, the monasteries were also involved

in trade and were the largest source of loans. People would deposit money and receive interest on their savings, and traders would raise capital from the monastic treasury, in many ways similar to a bank.

The Tibetan masses may have resented the wealth and privilege of the lay aristocracy, but the question of the economic power enjoyed by the religious institutions was viewed differently. For non-Tibetans, the economic power of the monastery was simply exploitation and the position of the lamas and the monks parasitic. But for the Tibetans such thoughts were irrelevant; they were willing to accept the special position enjoyed by the religious institutions and in fact much of the wealth of the monasteries was accumulated over centuries from voluntary contributions from the masses. Most of all, almost every Tibetan had a personal connection with a ' monastery, with either a close relative or a son living in a monastery. Deeply, attached to their monasteries, the Tibetans were reluctant to accept the changes proposed by the Chinese. The Chinese realised that the key to the success of the reforms lay in their ability to persuade the monasteries to relinquish their traditional privileges. "If we do not abolish the evils of the Tibetan Lamaseries, it will directly affect the progress and the growth of the Tibetan[s]", commented one Chinese writer. The reform of the religious establishment was seen as a pre-condition for the successful implementation of the general reform programme. In his speech to the second meeting of PCART the Panchen Rinpoche said that "we cannot conduct reforms in society and retain the temples' feudal exploitation and oppression".

Although the changes were couched in the language of social reform, there is no doubt that the monks and the religious hierarchy saw them as an attempt to undermine their status and power. When the monasteries were told that they would have to give up their lands, the monks immediately asked how they were to survive without the revenues from their estates. If the monasteries were to be deprived of their economic basis, they would not be able to support thousands of monks or carry out important religious ceremonies. While there are no reliable figures on the number of monks and nuns in Tibet, it is estimated that there were over 25 000 monks in the three largest monasteries near Lhasa, Sera, Drepung and Gaden. The Chinese say there were 2469 monasteries and 110 000 monks and nuns in Tibet. This represented 9.3 per cent of the total population of Tibet. The reforms envisaged by the Communists were totally incompatible with the traditional status of the monks. The Communists argued that the position of the majority of the monks was similar to that of *serfs* belonging to manorial estates. The Communists therefore hoped that they would welcome the reforms. In his speech at the PCART meeting Zhang Guohua announced that the campaign among the religious groups would be based upon opposition to the rebellion, privileges and exploitation and that the cadres would differentiate between those lamas and monasteries that took part in the rebellion and those that did not. Monks from the three largest monasteries had been active in the Lhasa uprising, and many smaller monasteries were accused of having harboured Khampa rebels (monks from eastern Tibet) who had sought refuge in monasteries in central Tibet. Therefore, there was hardly a monastery that was not implicated in the revolt.